Talos Vulnerability Report


Oracle OIT IX SDK TIFF file parsing heap buffer overflow

July 19, 2016
CVE Number



While parsing a specially crafted TIFF file, a parser confusion can lead to a heap buffer overflow resulting in out of bounds memory overwrite and possibly leading to arbitrary code execution.

Tested Versions

  • Outside In IX sdk 8.5.1.

Product URLs



While parsing a specially crafted TIFF file with PhotometricInterpretation set to 5, indicating a CMYK image, the same amount of memory is allocated as when processing the original file (with PhotometricInterpretation set to 3 in this case), but the parser takes a different path, ending in a loop that uses the size value as a counter. The overflow happens because in each iteration of the loop, 3 bytes are written to the destination thus leading to heap buffer overflow and overwrite of adjacent heap structures.

Technical information below:

Size of the allocation is based on ImageWidth value (at offset 0x6c in the supplied testcase) and is calculated in the following basic block in libvs_tiff.so (image base is 0xB74E1000):

.text:B74E8AEF mov     ecx, [esp+8Ch+arg_4]
.text:B74E8AF6 movzx   eax, word ptr [ecx+60h]
.text:B74E8AFA imul    eax, [ecx+30h]
.text:B74E8AFE movzx   edx, word ptr [ecx+0D8h]
.text:B74E8B05 imul    eax, edx
.text:B74E8B08 add     eax, 7
.text:B74E8B0B shr     eax, 3
.text:B74E8B0E mov     [ecx+3CCh], eax 			[1]
.text:B74E8B14 cmp     word ptr [ecx+0F8h], 0
.text:B74E8B1C jnz     loc_B74E8C01

At [1], the final value of the allocation is saved in ecx+0x3cc. The arithmetic can be translated into the following formula:

size = ((4*ImageWidth)+7)>>3

The allocation in question happens at the following basic block:

.text:B74E6866 mov     [esp+2Ch+var_18], eax
.text:B74E686A mov     esi, edx
.text:B74E686C mov     eax, [edx+3CCh] 			[1]
.text:B74E6872 mov     [esp+2Ch+s], eax
.text:B74E6875 call    _SYSNativeAlloc
.text:B74E687A mov     [esi+3D8h], eax
.text:B74E6880 test    eax, eax
.text:B74E6882 jz      loc_B74E6A

At [1], previously computed value is set as a parameter to SYSNativeAlloc which is a wrapper to malloc.

After the successful allocation, the parser eventually ends up in the following basic block where the overflow happens:

.text:B74EC2F3 mov     [edi], al 				[1]
.text:B74EC2F5 mov     eax, esi
.text:B74EC2F7 mov     [edi+1], al 				[2]
.text:B74EC2FA mov     [edi+2], dl 				[3]
.text:B74EC2FD mov     edx, [esp+26Ch+var_220]
.text:B74EC301 movzx   eax, word ptr [edx+0D8h]
.text:B74EC308 add     ebp, eax					[4]
.text:B74EC30A add     edi, 3 					[5]
.text:B74EC30D cmp     [edx+3CCh], ebp 			[6]
.text:B74EC313 ja      short loc_B74

At [1],[2] and [3] in the above basic block, 3 bytes are written to the destination buffer in edi which gets incremented by 3 at [5] in each iteration of the loop. At [4] eax is always 1, increasing the counter in ebp only by 1, resulting in an overflow as the counter is compared against the previously calculated allocation size at [6]. The 1 value in eax at [4] comes from SamplesPerPixel (at offset 0xD8 in the supplied testcase). Regular TIFF file with CMYK color map should have SamplesPerPixel value of 4.

To summarize, by controlling the size of the allocation, we can control the size of the overflow, as the number of bytes written in the loop that causes the overflow is SamplesPerPixel*SizeOfAllocation. Control over the data that gets written past the end of the buffer is subject to arithmetic transformations in the previous basic block. In the supplied testcase, the values have been malformed in such a way as to result in a function pointer overwrite. The application crashes when the overwritten function pointer is dereferenced during a call.

This issue can be triggered by running the supplied testcase in the ixsample application supplied with the SDK.


2016-04-12 - Vendor Notification
2016-07-19 – Public Disclosure


Discovered by Aleksandar Nikolic of Cisco Talos.