Talos Vulnerability Report


Realtek rtl819x Jungle SDK boa formWsc stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability

July 8, 2024
CVE Number



A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the boa formWsc functionality of Realtek rtl819x Jungle SDK v3.4.11. A specially crafted series of HTTP requests can lead to remote code execution. An attacker can send a series of HTTP requests to trigger this vulnerability.


The versions below were either tested or verified to be vulnerable by Talos or confirmed to be vulnerable by the vendor.

LevelOne WBR-6013 RER4_A_v3411b_2T2R_LEV_09_170623
Realtek rtl819x Jungle SDK v3.4.11


rtl819x Jungle SDK - https://www.realtek.com/en/ WBR-6013 - https://www.level1.com/level1_en/wbr-6013-n300-wireless-router-54069103


7.2 - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H


CWE-121 - Stack-based Buffer Overflow


The rtl819x Jungle SDK is an SDK for routers. This SDK uses as web server boa.

This Realtek rtl819x Jungle SDK vulnerability was found while researching the Levelone WBR-6013 router. We are going to explain this vulnerability from the perspective of the WBR-6013 router.

The WBR-6013 router has a web server called boa. The version used in the device is that of a Realtek SDK that uses boa. One of the SDK’s API is /boafrm/formWsc. This API allows modifications of the Wi-Fi WPS settings. The function responsible for this API is boa’s formWsc:

void formWsc(request *wp, char *path, char *query)
[1] targetAPMac = req_get_cstream_var(wp, "targetAPMac", (""));
    strVal = req_get_cstream_var(wp, ("triggerPIN"), "");
    if (strVal[0]) {
        int local_pin_changed = 0;
[2]     apmib_get(MIB_WLAN_WSC_DISABLE, (void *)&intVal);
        if (intVal) {
        else {
            if (local_pin_changed) {
            else {
                    unsigned char targetAPMacFilter[20];
                    int idx = 0;
                    int idx2 = 0;
[3]                 for(idx;idx<strlen(targetAPMac);idx++){
                        if( _is_hex(targetAPMac[idx])){
[4]                         targetAPMacFilter[idx2]=targetAPMac[idx];

At [1] the targetAPMac request’s parameter is fetched in the targetAPMac variable. Then, if the triggerPIN request’s parameter is provided and has a value different than the empty string, the code at [2] is reached. At [2] the MIB_WLAN_WSC_DISABLE flash entry is fetched. If its value is 0, meaning that the WPS is enabled, assuming the targetAPMac variable has a value different than the empty string, then the code at [3] is reached. At [3] a for loop is executed where each character of targetAPMac is checked using the _is_hex function. If _is_hex returns true, the character is copied into the targetAPMacFilter stack buffer. Essentially, the for loop copies only the hexadecimal characters from targetAPMac into targetAPMacFilter.

Because no checks are performed on the size of the targetAPMac request’s parameter, a buffer overflow can occur at [4] in the stack buffer targetAPMacFilter, possibly leading to arbitrary code execution.

Crash Information

Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x41414141 in ?? ()

[ Legend: Modified register | Code | Heap | Stack | String ]
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── registers ────
$zero: 0x00000000  →  0x00000000
$at  : 0xfffffff8  →  0xfffffff8
$v0  : 0x00000071  →  0x00000071
$v1  : 0x000008a1  →  0x000008a1
$a0  : 0x004c5db4  →  0x6578742f  →  0x6578742f ("ext/"?)
$a1  : 0x407ffb9d  →  0x00203220  →  0x00203220
$a2  : 0x00000000  →  0x00000000
$a3  : 0x00000000  →  0x00000000
$t0  : 0x0000003e  →  0x0000003e
$t1  : 0xbf8004d4  →  0xbf8004d4
$t2  : 0x00000002  →  0x00000002
$t3  : 0x00000200  →  0x00000200
$t4  : 0x00000100  →  0x00000100
$t5  : 0x00000807  →  0x00000807
$t6  : 0x00000800  →  0x00000800
$t7  : 0x004b0000  →  0x004b0000
$s0  : 0x41414141  →  0x41414141 ("AAAA"?)
$s1  : 0x41414141  →  0x41414141 ("AAAA"?)
$s2  : 0x41414141  →  0x41414141 ("AAAA"?)
$s3  : 0x41414141  →  0x41414141 ("AAAA"?)
$s4  : 0x41414141  →  0x41414141 ("AAAA"?)
$s5  : 0x41414141  →  0x41414141 ("AAAA"?)
$s6  : 0x41414141  →  0x41414141 ("AAAA"?)
$s7  : 0x0044975c  →  0x666f726d  →  0x666f726d ("form"?)
$t8  : 0x004b56c0  →  0x3ff44400  →  0x28c80008  →  0x28c80008
$t9  : 0x3ff44400  →  0x28c80008  →  0x28c80008
$k0  : 0x00000000  →  0x00000000
$k1  : 0x00000000  →  0x00000000
$s8  : 0x0000005c  →  0x0000005c
$pc  : 0x41414141  →  0x41414141 ("AAAA"?)
$sp  : 0x40800550  →  0x41414141  →  0x41414141 ("AAAA"?)
$hi  : 0x000000c9  →  0x000000c9
$lo  : 0x0003c754  →  0x0003c754
$fir : 0x00739300  →  0x00739300
$ra  : 0x41414141  →  0x41414141 ("AAAA"?)
$gp  : 0x3ff875c0  →  0x6c5f636f  →  0x6c5f636f ("l_co"?)
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── stack ────
0x40800550│+0x0000: 0x41414141  →  0x41414141	 ← $sp
0x40800554│+0x0004: 0x41414141  →  0x41414141
0x40800558│+0x0008: 0x41414141  →  0x41414141
0x4080055c│+0x000c: 0x41414141  →  0x41414141
0x40800560│+0x0010: 0x41414141  →  0x41414141
0x40800564│+0x0014: 0x41414141  →  0x41414141
0x40800568│+0x0018: 0x41414141  →  0x41414141
0x4080056c│+0x001c: 0x41414141  →  0x41414141
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── code:mips:MIPS32 ────
[!] Cannot disassemble from $PC
[!] Cannot access memory at address 0x41414140
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── threads ────
[#0] Id 1, stopped 0x41414141 in ?? (), reason: SIGSEGV

Exploit Proof of Concept

To use a specific API of the web server, because of a CSRF protection mechanism, it is necessary to load the HTML page that would call that API:

curl --user admin:admin http://<DEVICE_IP>/wlwps.htm &>/dev/null 

After this request it is possible to use the /boafrm/formWsc API:


Assuming the WPS functionality is enabled, after the request, the boa process will crash. The POC uses the default admin credentials.


Realtek has provided updates software to their customers. LevelOne has declined to patch the issues in their software.


2023-12-14 - Initial Vendor Contact
2023-12-22 - Vendor Disclosure
2024-05-20 - Vendor Patch Release
2024-07-08 - Public Release


Discovered by Francesco Benvenuto of Cisco Talos.