Talos Vulnerability Report

SUMMARY

A buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the adm.cgi set_TR069() functionality of Wavlink AC3000 M33A8.V5030.210505. A specially crafted HTTP request can lead to stack-based buffer overflow. An attacker can make an authenticated HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.

CONFIRMED VULNERABLE VERSIONS

The versions below were either tested or verified to be vulnerable by Talos or confirmed to be vulnerable by the vendor.

Wavlink AC3000 M33A8.V5030.210505

PRODUCT URLS

Wavlink AC3000 - https://www.wavlink.com/en_us/product/WL-WN533A8.html

CVSSv3 SCORE

9.1 - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

CWE

CWE-120 - Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input (‘Classic Buffer Overflow’)

DETAILS

The Wavlink AC3000 wireless router is predominately one of the most popular gigabit routers in the US, in part due to both its potential wireless and wired speed capabilities and extremely low price point (costing at the time of this writing ~$60 USD). Among the configuration options, it’s also able to act as a standalone wireless gateway, a basic network router, or a wireless repeater.

When interacting with and configuring the Wavlink AC3000 wifi router, as is typical of most wifi routers, an administrator logs in via some web portal and configures appropriate options via the HTTP interface. In the case of this particular router, and in another somewhat common execution pattern, these HTML pages can invoke .cgi binaries due to how the lighttpd server is configured. Since all of these .shtml and .cgi files are located in the web root, anyone with network access to the device doesn’t actually need to log in to the device to interact with these .cgi files, and it usually is the responsibility of the .cgi binary to check if the authentication is completed successfully. On this device, one will see a check_valid_user() function in each individual .cgi binary which will check the session cookie of the HTTP request to see if it’s coming from a validly logged in user.

Assuming that we’ve passed this check in the adm.cgi binary, we then run into a set of functions that we can call based off of what we pass for the page= parameter in our HTTP POST request. Of the available commands, we focus on the following:

00401a28                          else if (strcmp(webget_page, "TR069") == 0)
00401b84                              set_TR069(contlen_buf)

If we provide page=TR069, we enter the set_TR069 function and our provided POST data is further parsed therein:

00408d70  int32_t set_TR069(int32_t arg1)

00408db8      void var_140
00408db8      memset(&var_140, 0, 0x100)
00408df0      int32_t $v0_1 = strdup(web_get("TR069_local_enable", arg1, 0))
00408e28      int32_t $v0_3 = strdup(web_get("TR069_acs_url", arg1, 0))
00408e5c      int32_t $v0_5 = strdup(web_get("TR069_acs_username", arg1, 0))
00408e90      int32_t $v0_7 = strdup(web_get("TR069_acs_password", arg1, 0))
00408ec4      int32_t TR069_local_port = strdup(web_get("TR069_local_port", arg1, 0))  // [1]
00408ef8      int32_t $v0_10 = strdup(web_get("TR069_local_username", arg1, 0))
00408f2c      int32_t $v0_12 = strdup(web_get("TR069_local_password", arg1, 0))
00408f64      int32_t $v0_14 = strdup(web_get("TR069_acs_periodic_interval", arg1, 0))
00408f9c      int32_t $v0_16 = strdup(web_get("TR069_acs_periodic_enable", arg1, 0))
00408fbc      nvram_bufset(0, "TR069_local_enable", $v0_1)
00408fd8      nvram_bufset(0, "TR069_acs_url", $v0_3)
00408ff4      nvram_bufset(0, "TR069_acs_username", $v0_5)
00409010      nvram_bufset(0, "TR069_acs_password", $v0_7)
0040902c      nvram_bufset(0, "TR069_local_port", TR069_local_port)
00409048      nvram_bufset(0, "TR069_local_username", $v0_10)
00409064      nvram_bufset(0, "TR069_local_password", $v0_12)
00409080      nvram_bufset(0, "TR069_acs_periodic_enable", $v0_16)
00409090      if (sx.d(*$v0_14) != 0)
004091f4          nvram_bufset(0, "TR069_acs_periodic_interval", $v0_14)
004090a0      nvram_commit(0)
004090bc      sprintf(&var_140, "iptables -t filter -I INPUT -p tcp --dport %s -j A…", TR069_local_port) // [2]
004090d4      system(&var_140)
004090f0      sprintf(&var_140, "iptables -t filter -I INPUT -p udp --dport %s -j A…", TR069_local_port) // [3]
00409108      system(&var_140)
00409130      if (access("/tmp/web_log", 0) == 0)
00409184          int32_t $v0_20 = fopen("/dev/console", &data_415758)
00409190          if ($v0_20 != 0)
004091bc              fprintf($v0_20, "%s:%s:%d:start easycwmpd................\n\n", "adm.c", "set_TR069", 0x8aa)
004091d4              fclose($v0_20)
00409170      return do_system("easycwmpd &")

At [1], the binary copies our TR069_local_port POST parameter to the heap and then at [2] and [3], copies our input buffer to the stack in order to run some iptables commands. Since there’s no length checking on our input buffer, we can easily provide a buffer longer than 0x140 bytes, which will overwrite the return address of this function and quickly result in arbitrary code execution.

Crash Information

Thread 2.1 "adm.cgi" hit Breakpoint 3, 0x00408db0 in set_TR069 ()
(gdb) b *0x4090bc
Breakpoint 4 at 0x4090bc
(gdb) c
Continuing.

Thread 2.1 "adm.cgi" hit Breakpoint 4, 0x004090bc in set_TR069 ()
(gdb) x/1s $a2
0xc211b0:       'A' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) c
Continuing.
[Detaching after fork from child process 12784]
[Detaching after fork from child process 12825]
[Detaching after fork from child process 12866]

Thread 2.1 "adm.cgi" received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x41414141 in ?? ()
(gdb) info reg
          zero       at       v0       v1       a0       a1       a2       a3
 R0   00000000 00000000 00000000 ffffffff 00000003 7f823a04 00000000 00000000
            t0       t1       t2       t3       t4       t5       t6       t7
 R8   00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000001
            s0       s1       s2       s3       s4       s5       s6       s7
 R16  41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141
            t8       t9       k0       k1       gp       sp       s8       ra
 R24  00000000 77963450 00000010 00000000 77a00490 7f823c08 41414141 41414141
        status       lo       hi badvaddr    cause       pc
      0100fc13 00000000 00000000 41414140 50800008 41414141
          fcsr      fir      hi1      lo1      hi2      lo2      hi3      lo3
      00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
        dspctl  restart
      00000000 00000000

TIMELINE

2024-07-25 - Initial Vendor Contact
2024-07-29 - Requesting reply from vendor
2024-07-30 - Vendor confirms receipt
2024-07-30 - Vendor Disclosure
2024-07-30 - Vendor confirms receipt
2024-09-02 - Status update request sent
2024-10-15 - Status update request. Upcoming expiration date announced.
2024-10-22 - Vendor replies product has been discontinued, but patches are being worked on
2024-11-04 - Status update request for patch release dates
2024-11-12 TALOS advisory release date announced
2025-01-14 - Public Release