Talos Vulnerability Report

TALOS-2026-2416

VideoLan VLC NUV File keyframe Out-Of-Bounds Read Vulnerability

November 16, 2026

CVE Number

CVE-2026-32789

Summary

An out-of-bounds read vulnerability exists in VideoLAN VLC 3.0.23. By using a specially crafted NUV file, an attacker could exploit this vulnerability to perform an out-of-bounds read, potentially leading to the disclosure of sensitive information.

Confirmed Vulnerable Versions

The versions below were either tested or verified to be vulnerable by Talos or confirmed to be vulnerable by the vendor.

VLC (version(s): 3.0.23)

Product URLs

VLC - https://www.videolan.org/vlc/

CVSSv3 Score

4.3 - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

CWE

CWE-125 - Out-of-bounds Read

Details

VLC media player is a free and open-source multimedia player and framework developed by the VideoLAN project. It supports a wide range of audio and video formats, streaming protocols, and media containers without requiring additional codecs.It is one of the most widely used media players worldwide due to its reliability, broad format support, and availability across multiple platforms.

This vulnerability is related to the NUV file format, which is a legacy video container format. An NUV file consists of a header followed by a series of frames. The structure of the file header is as follows:

Offset Size   Name
------ ----- --------------------------------------
0x00    0x0C  Signature (MythTVVideo\x00 or NuppelVideo\x00 )
0x0c    0x05  Version
0x11    0x03  Reserved
0x14    0x04  Width
0x18    0x04  Height
0x1C    0x04  Width_desired
0x20    0x04  Height_desired
0x24    0x01  Mode
0x25    0x03  Reserved_2
0x28    0x08  Aspect
0x30    0x08  FPS
0x38    0x04  Video_blocks
0x3C    0x04  Audio_blocks
0x40    0x04  Text_blocks
0x44    0x04  Keyframe_distance

The signature value for an NUV file is MythTVVideo\x00 or NuppelVideo\x00. After the header, the file contains frames such as video, audio, extra data, seek table, and so on.

A frame begins with a frame header followed by the frame data. The structure of a frame header is as follows:

Offset Size   Name
------ ----- --------------------------------------
0x00    0x01  frame_type
0x01    0x01  frame_compression
0x02    0x01  keyframe
0x03    0x01  frame_filters
0x04    0x04  timecode
0x08    0x08  frame_length

The frame_type field specifies the type of frame. It can take the value D for an Extra Data frame, X for an Extended Data frame, or Q for a seektable frame. The frame_length field indicates the number of bytes of frame data that follow the frame header.

For this vulnerability, Extended Data and keyframe frames are relevant.

When frame_type is X, the frame is an Extended Data frame. The structure of Extended Data frame data is as follows:

Offset Size    Name
------ ----   ----------

0x00    0x04  eh_version 
0x04    0x04  eh_video_fcc 
0x08    0x04  eh_audio_fcc 
0x0C    0x04  eh_audio_sample_rate 
0x10    0x04  eh_audio_bits_per_sample 
0x14    0x04  eh_audio_channels 
0x18    0x04  eh_audio_compression_ratio 
0x1C    0x04  eh_audio_quality 
0x20    0x04  eh_rtjpeg_quality 
0x24    0x04  eh_rtjpeg_luma_filter 
0x28    0x04  eh_rtjpeg_chroma_filter 
0x2C    0x04  eh_lavc_bitrate 
0x30    0x04  eh_lavc_qmin 
0x34    0x04  eh_lavc_qmax 
0x38    0x04  eh_lavc_maxqdiff 
0x3c    0x08  eh_seektable_offset 
0x44    0x08  eh_keyframe_adjust_offset 

The eh_seektable_offset field specifies the offset of the seektable frame from the beginning of the file. The eh_keyframe_adjust_offset field specifies the offset of the keyframe frame from the beginning of the file.

The keyframe frame begins with a frame header in which the frame_type value is K. Following the frame header, the keyframe frame contains kfa_table, which is frame_length bytes long.

The following code is taken from modules\demux\nuv.c

    if( fh.i_type == 'K' && fh.i_length >= 8 )
        {
            p_kfa_table = malloc( fh.i_length );  //<------------------------ (A)

        [...]
            if( vlc_stream_Read( p_demux->s, p_kfa_table,
                                 fh.i_length ) != fh.i_length )
            {
                free( p_seek_table );
                free( p_kfa_table );
                return VLC_EGENERIC;
            }

            i_kfa_elements = fh.i_length / 8; //<------------------------ (B)
        }
    }

[...]


 for( int32_t j = 0; j < i_seek_elements; j++)
    {

[...]
        keyframe = GetDWLE( p_seek_table + j * 12 + 8 );

        frame += (keyframe - last_keyframe) * p_sys->hdr.i_keyframe_distance;

        if( kfa_entry_id < i_kfa_elements && *(int32_t*)(p_kfa_table + kfa_entry_id * 12 + 4) == j ) //<-------------- (C)
        {
            frame -= *(int32_t*)(p_kfa_table + kfa_entry_id * 12);  //<------------------------------ (D)
            msg_Dbg( p_demux, "corrected keyframe %d with current frame number %d (corrected with %d)",
                        keyframe, frame, *(int32_t*)(p_kfa_table + kfa_entry_id * 12) );
            kfa_entry_id++;
        }

At (A), a buffer is allocated to read kfa_table from the keyframe frame. Here, fh.i_length is the frame_length value from the keyframe frame header. The total number of elements in the kfa_table table is calculated at (B) by dividing the frame_length of the keyframe frame by 8. However, elements of kfa_table are accessed by multiplying the element index by 12. This leads to an out-of-bounds read condition when kfa_table is accessed at (C) or (D).

Note that, because of this incorrect calculation, a normal file can also trigger the vulnerable condition.

This condition can be confirmed by running VLC under a debugger with PageHeap enabled on Windows:

Time Travel Position: E5216:207
libnuv_plugin+0x24ac:
00007fff`cb3e24ac 4180bc24d20000004b cmp   byte ptr [r12+0D2h],4Bh ds:0000024b`58075fd2=4b ;<-------------- (1)
0:008> p
Time Travel Position: E5216:208
libnuv_plugin+0x24b5:
00007fff`cb3e24b5 0f8465030000    je      libnuv_plugin+0x2820 (00007fff`cb3e2820) [br=1]
0:008> p
Time Travel Position: E5216:209
libnuv_plugin+0x2820:
00007fff`cb3e2820 458bbc24da000000 mov     r15d,dword ptr [r12+0DAh] ds:0000024b`58075fda=00000020 ;<-------------- (2)
0:008> p
Time Travel Position: E5216:20A
libnuv_plugin+0x2828:
00007fff`cb3e2828 4183ff07        cmp     r15d,7

0:008> db 0000024b`58075fd2 LC
0000024b`58075fd2  4b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00-20 00 00 00              K....... ...   ;<---------------------(3)

:008> p
Time Travel Position: E5216:20B
libnuv_plugin+0x282c:
00007fff`cb3e282c 0f8e89fcffff    jle     libnuv_plugin+0x24bb (00007fff`cb3e24bb) [br=0]
0:008> p
Time Travel Position: E5216:20C
libnuv_plugin+0x2832:
00007fff`cb3e2832 4d63ef          movsxd  r13,r15d
0:008> p
Time Travel Position: E5216:20D
libnuv_plugin+0x2835:
00007fff`cb3e2835 4c89e9          mov     rcx,r13
0:008> p
Time Travel Position: E5216:20E
libnuv_plugin+0x2838:
00007fff`cb3e2838 e8331b0000      call    libnuv_plugin!vlc_entry_license__3_0_0f+0x1130 (00007fff`cb3e4370) ;<---------------------(4)
0:008> r
rax=000000000000000c rbx=0000024b58075f00 rcx=0000000000000020 
rdx=0000000000000000 rsi=0000000000000000 rdi=000000000000d4c0
rip=00007fffcb3e2838 rsp=00000056f7dfed60 rbp=0000024b65603f60
 r8=000000000000d738  r9=000000000000d7d4 r10=000000000000d72c
r11=000000000000004b r12=0000024b58075f00 r13=0000000000000020 
r14=0000000000000000 r15=0000000000000020 
iopl=0         nv up ei pl nz ac pe nc
cs=0033  ss=002b  ds=002b  es=002b  fs=0053  gs=002b             efl=00000212
libnuv_plugin+0x2838:
00007fff`cb3e2838 e8331b0000      call    libnuv_plugin!vlc_entry_license__3_0_0f+0x1130 (00007fff`cb3e4370)
0:008> p
Time Travel Position: E5234:3DE
libnuv_plugin+0x283d:
00007fff`cb3e283d 4885c0          test    rax,rax
0:008> dd rax                                                      ;<---------------------(5)
0000024b`65482fe0  c0c0c0c0 c0c0c0c0 c0c0c0c0 c0c0c0c0 
0000024b`65482ff0  c0c0c0c0 c0c0c0c0 c0c0c0c0 c0c0c0c0
0000024b`65483000  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????

:008> p
Time Travel Position: E5234:3E1
libnuv_plugin+0x284b:
00007fff`cb3e284b 488b4d50        mov     rcx,qword ptr [rbp+50h] ss:0000024b`65603fb0=0000024b62f6ef30
0:008> p
Time Travel Position: E5234:3E2
libnuv_plugin+0x284f:
00007fff`cb3e284f 4889c2          mov     rdx,rax
0:008> p
Time Travel Position: E5234:3E3
libnuv_plugin+0x2852:
00007fff`cb3e2852 4d89e8          mov     r8,r13
0:008> p
Time Travel Position: E5234:3E4
libnuv_plugin+0x2855:
00007fff`cb3e2855 e80e0a0000      call    libnuv_plugin!vlc_entry_license__3_0_0f+0x28 (00007fff`cb3e3268) ;<---------------- (6)
0:008> db 0000024b`65482fe0 L30
0000024b`65482fe0  c0 c0 c0 c0 c0 c0 c0 c0-c0 c0 c0 c0 c0 c0 c0 c0  ................
0000024b`65482ff0  c0 c0 c0 c0 c0 c0 c0 c0-c0 c0 c0 c0 c0 c0 c0 c0  ................
0000024b`65483000  ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??  ????????????????
0:008> p
Time Travel Position: E5234:55C
libnuv_plugin+0x285a:
00007fff`cb3e285a 4c39e8          cmp     rax,r13
0:008> db 0000024b`65482fe0 L30                                        ; <---------------- (7)
0000024b`65482fe0  01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00-00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00  ................
0000024b`65482ff0  01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00-01 00 00 00 02 00 00 00  ................
0000024b`65483000  ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??  ????????????????

At (1), the frame_type of the keyframe frame is validated. In this case, the value of frame_length is 0x20, which can be observed at (2). The complete frame header of the keyframe frame can be observed at (3). At (4), malloc is called to allocate a kfa_table buffer of size 0x20. The vulnerable kfa_table buffer is examined at (5). The function called at (6) writes kfa_table. The contents of kfa_table can be examined at (7).

0:008> p
Time Travel Position: E5234:561
libnuv_plugin+0x2876:
00007fff`cb3e2876 4c8d0db3370000  lea     r9,[libnuv_plugin!vlc_entry_license__3_0_0f+0x2df0 (00007fff`cb3e6030)]
0:008> p
Time Travel Position: E5234:562
libnuv_plugin+0x287d:
00007fff`cb3e287d 41c1ff03        sar     r15d,3 ;<------------------------ (8)
0:008> r
rax=00007fffcb3e61f0 rbx=0000024b58075f00 rcx=00007fffe5156910
rdx=00007fffcb3e6428 rsi=0000000000000000 rdi=000000000000d4c0
rip=00007fffcb3e287d rsp=00000056f7dfed60 rbp=0000024b65603f60
 r8=00007fffcb3e6458  r9=00007fffcb3e6030 r10=000000000000d738
r11=0000000000000020 r12=0000024b58075f00 r13=0000000000000020 
r14=0000000000000000 r15=0000000000000020 
iopl=0         nv up ei pl zr na po nc
cs=0033  ss=002b  ds=002b  es=002b  fs=0053  gs=002b             efl=00000246
libnuv_plugin+0x287d:
00007fff`cb3e287d 41c1ff03        sar     r15d,3
0:008> p
Time Travel Position: E5234:563
libnuv_plugin+0x2881:
00007fff`cb3e2881 c744242035030000 mov     dword ptr [rsp+20h],335h ss:00000056`f7dfed80=00000311
0:008> r
rax=00007fffcb3e61f0 rbx=0000024b58075f00 rcx=00007fffe5156910
rdx=00007fffcb3e6428 rsi=0000000000000000 rdi=000000000000d4c0
rip=00007fffcb3e2881 rsp=00000056f7dfed60 rbp=0000024b65603f60
 r8=00007fffcb3e6458  r9=00007fffcb3e6030 r10=000000000000d738
r11=0000000000000020 r12=0000024b58075f00 r13=0000000000000020 
r14=0000000000000000 r15=0000000000000004
iopl=0         nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
cs=0033  ss=002b  ds=002b  es=002b  fs=0053  gs=002b             efl=00000202
libnuv_plugin+0x2881:
00007fff`cb3e2881 c744242035030000 mov     dword ptr [rsp+20h],335h ss:00000056`f7dfed80=00000311
[...]

0:008> 
Time Travel Position: E5307:7A
libnuv_plugin+0x2555:
00007fff`cb3e2555 448b7e08        mov     r15d,dword ptr [rsi+8] ds:0000024b`0a824b48=00000000
0:008> p
Time Travel Position: E5307:7B
libnuv_plugin+0x2559:
00007fff`cb3e2559 4589fb          mov     r11d,r15d
0:008> p
Time Travel Position: E5307:7C
libnuv_plugin+0x255c:
00007fff`cb3e255c 4529f3          sub     r11d,r14d
0:008> p
Time Travel Position: E5307:7D
libnuv_plugin+0x255f:
00007fff`cb3e255f 440faf5b44      imul    r11d,dword ptr [rbx+44h] ds:0000024b`58075f44=0000000f
0:008> p
Time Travel Position: E5307:7E
libnuv_plugin+0x2564:
00007fff`cb3e2564 4501dc          add     r12d,r11d
0:008> p
Time Travel Position: E5307:7F
libnuv_plugin+0x2567:
00007fff`cb3e2567 44396c2454      cmp     dword ptr [rsp+54h],r13d ss:00000056`f7dfedb4=00000004
0:008> r
rax=0000000000000000 rbx=0000024b58075f00 rcx=0000000000000008
rdx=00007fffe5156910 rsi=0000024b0a824b40 rdi=0000000000000000
rip=00007fffcb3e2567 rsp=00000056f7dfed60 rbp=0000024b65603f60
 r8=00000000000011ba  r9=0000000000000000 r10=0000024b58075fc0
r11=0000000000000000 r12=0000000000000000 r13=0000000000000000
r14=0000000000000000 r15=0000000000000000
iopl=0         nv up ei pl zr na po nc
cs=0033  ss=002b  ds=002b  es=002b  fs=0053  gs=002b             efl=00000246
libnuv_plugin+0x2567:
00007fff`cb3e2567 44396c2454      cmp     dword ptr [rsp+54h],r13d ss:00000056`f7dfedb4=00000004

At (8), i_kfa_elements is calculated by dividing frame_length by 8. Later, a loop begins to read kfa_table i_kfa_elements times. However, although the number of elements is calculated assuming each element is 8 bytes long, the code accesses each element using a 12-byte stride, which causes an out-of-bounds read while accessing kfa_table. This becomes evident at the time of the crash:

0:008> g
nuv demux debug: corrected keyframe 0 with current frame number -1 (corrected with 1)
nuv demux debug: corrected keyframe 1 with current frame number 13 (corrected with 1)
nuv demux debug: corrected keyframe 2 with current frame number 27 (corrected with 1)
(13608.70e0): Access violation - code c0000005 (first/second chance not available)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
Time Travel Position: E5558:0
libnuv_plugin+0x257f:
00007fff`cb3e257f 397c1004        cmp     dword ptr [rax+rdx+4],edi ds:0000024b`65483008=????????

0:008> r
rax=0000024b65482fe0 rbx=0000024b58075f00 rcx=0000000000000003
rdx=0000000000000024 rsi=0000024b0a824b64 rdi=0000000000000003
rip=00007fffcb3e257f rsp=00000056f7dfed60 rbp=0000024b65603f60
 r8=00000000000027d8  r9=0000024b631c91a0 r10=00000000019bfcc0
r11=000000000000000f r12=000000000000002a r13=0000000000000003
r14=0000000000000024 r15=0000000000000003
iopl=0         nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=0033  ss=002b  ds=002b  es=002b  fs=0053  gs=002b             efl=00000206
libnuv_plugin+0x257f:
00007fff`cb3e257f 397c1004        cmp     dword ptr [rax+rdx+4],edi ds:0000024b`65483008=????????

0:008> u
libnuv_plugin+0x257f:
00007fff`cb3e257f 397c1004        cmp     dword ptr [rax+rdx+4],edi
00007fff`cb3e2583 0f843b020000    je      libnuv_plugin+0x27c4 (00007fff`cb3e27c4)
00007fff`cb3e2589 4d63f4          movsxd  r14,r12d
00007fff`cb3e258c 660feff6        pxor    xmm6,xmm6
00007fff`cb3e2590 4d69d640420f00  imul    r10,r14,0F4240h
00007fff`cb3e2597 4c8b06          mov     r8,qword ptr [rsi]
00007fff`cb3e259a 4d85c0          test    r8,r8
00007fff`cb3e259d f2490f2af2      cvtsi2sd xmm6,r10
0:008> dd 0000024b`65483008
0000024b`65483008  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
0000024b`65483018  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
0000024b`65483028  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
0000024b`65483038  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
0000024b`65483048  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
0000024b`65483058  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
0000024b`65483068  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
0000024b`65483078  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????


0:008> kb
 # RetAddr               : Args to Child                                                           : Call Site
00 00007fff`e4ec8339     : 00000056`f7dff240 00007ff8`d2a22785 00001000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : libnuv_plugin+0x257f
01 00007fff`e4ec8726     : 00000000`00000000 00007fff`e50307ef 0000024b`6268bf80 00007fff`e50336a2 : libvlccore!vlc_ureduce+0x149
02 00007fff`e4eefbff     : 0000024b`65603f60 00000000`0000001e 0000024b`6cea7ff4 00007fff`e50307a5 : libvlccore!vlc_module_load+0x226
03 00007fff`e4f0174d     : 0000024b`6268bf80 0000024b`479ddf50 00000056`00000020 0000024b`62693fb7 : libvlccore!demux_New+0x5ff
04 00007fff`e4f05614     : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : libvlccore!vlc_demux_chained_Delete+0x10b8d
05 00007fff`e4f079ec     : 0000024b`50bc0fa0 00007ff8`d25b9c60 00000000`00000000 0000024b`511ddd20 : libvlccore!input_GetItem+0x1754
06 00007fff`e4f5e8b6     : 00000000`00000000 00007ff8`d29feb3b 0000024b`7d156d20 00000000`00000000 : libvlccore!input_Read+0x13c
07 00007ff8`d29ff0ad     : 0000024b`7d156d20 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 0000024b`7d156d20 : libvlccore!vlc_rand_bytes+0x986
08 00007ff8`d29ff17c     : 00007ff8`d2a5e500 0000024b`7d156d20 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : msvcrt!_callthreadstartex+0x1d
09 00007ff8`d25be8d7     : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : msvcrt!_threadstartex+0x7c
0a 00007ff8`d3e6c3fc     : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 000004f0`fffffb30 000004d0`fffffb30 : KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x17
0b 00000000`00000000     : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : ntdll!RtlUserThreadStart+0x2c

0:008> lmDvm libnuv_plugin
Browse full module list
start             end                 module name
00007fff`cb3e0000 00007fff`cb3f2000   libnuv_plugin   (export symbols)       libnuv_plugin.dll
    Loaded symbol image file: libnuv_plugin.dll
    Mapped memory image file: C:\Program Files\VideoLAN\VLC\plugins\demux\libnuv_plugin.dll
    Image path: C:\Program Files\VideoLAN\VLC\plugins\demux\libnuv_plugin.dll
    Image name: libnuv_plugin.dll
    Browse all global symbols  functions  data  Symbol Reload
    Timestamp:        ***** Invalid (C880C748)
    CheckSum:         00014C1A
    ImageSize:        00012000
    File version:     3.0.23.0
    Product version:  3.0.23.0
    File flags:       0 (Mask 0)
    File OS:          4 Unknown Win32
    File type:        2.0 Dll
    File date:        00000000.00000000
    Translations:     0409.04e4
    Information from resource tables:
        CompanyName:      VideoLAN
        ProductName:      VLC media player
        ProductVersion:   3,0,23,0
        FileVersion:      3.0.23
        FileDescription:  LibVLC plugin
        LegalCopyright:   Copyright © 1996-2025 VideoLAN and VLC Authors
        LegalTrademarks:  VLC media player, VideoLAN and x264 are registered trademarks from VideoLAN

Exploiting this vulnerability allows for the reading of arbitrary memory within the process, potentially disclosing sensitive information.

Vendor Response (CVE-2026-32789)

Vendor Link: https://code.videolan.org/videolan/vlc/-/merge_requests/10015

Timeline

2026-05-13 - Vendor Disclosure

Credit

KPC of Cisco Talos